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FEDERAL PROCEDURE-JUDGMENTS-FINALITY OF JUDGMENT REQUIRED To 
BEGIN RUNNING OF TIME FOR APPEAL-Plaintiff brought action in a federal 
district court to recover taxes alleged to have been illegally assessed, and for 
interest thereon. On April 14, 1955, after hearing plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment, the district judge filed an opinion stating that the mo-
tion was granted, and finding the amount of the taxes paid, but not finding 
the date of payment or the amount of interest due. The clerk noted: "April 
14, 1955 •.. Decision rendered on motion for summary judgment. Motion 
granted. See opinion on file." On May 24, 1955, plaintiff submitted a formal 
judgment which was signed and filed by the district judge. The clerk en-
tered the judgment, noting the amount of taxes, interest and costs due the 
plaintiff. Defendant filed his appeal on July 21, 1955, and plaintiff's motion 
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to dismiss the appeal as untimely1 was sustained. On certiorari to the United 
States Supreme Court, held, reversed, two justices dissenting. The actions 
of all the parties show that the opinion of April 14 was not intended as a 
final judgment and therefore could not be a direction to enter judgment 
under rule 58.2 Furthermore, the clerk's entry of April 14 failed to state 
the substance of the judgment as required by rule 79(a),3 since it failed to 
show the amount of interest due. Therefore, the entry of May 24 constituted 
the entry of judgment and the defendant's appeal was timely. United States 
v. F & M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227 (1958). 
It is clear that the intent of the judge is the crucial factor in determining 
finality of the judgment,4 and that no formal judgment need be rendered as 
a prerequisite to entry of judgment by the clerk.5 But there has been a con-
flict as to whether a second, formal judgment should be considered in de-
termining the judge's intent. One view is that the original judgment should 
not be open to reassessment because the policy of rule 58 is to avoid delay, 
and because the court delegates its function to counsel by permitting them 
to present a second judgment.6 An argument made in support of this view 
is that it should not be supposed that the judge sought to extend the time 
for appeal and therefore the second judgment should be treated as a mere 
inadvertence.7 The conflicting view is based on the argument that the judge 
seemingly has not made an empty gesture in filing the second opinion and 
that all his actions must be considered in determining his intent.8 In the 
principal case the majority has extended the latter view beyond use of the 
second judgment merely to determine intent and, adopting the reasoning 
1 Under rule 73(a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952): "When an appeal is 
permitted by law from a district court to a court of appeals the time within which an 
appeal may be taken ... in any action in which the United States ... is a party ... 
shall be 60 days from such entry .... " 
2 Rule 58, Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952): "When the court directs that a 
party recover only money or costs or that all relief be denied, the clerk shall enter judg-
ment forthwith upon receipt by him of the direction .... The notation of a judgment 
in the civil docket as provided by Rule 79(a) constitutes the entry of the judgment; and 
the judgment is not effective before such entry." 
3 Rule 79(a), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., 28 U.S.C. (1952): "These notations shall be brief 
·but shall show . . . the substance of each order or judgment of the court. . . ." 
4 In re Forstner Chain Corp., (1st Cir. 1949) 177 F. (2d) 572; Matteson v. United 
States, (2d Cir. 1956) 240 F. (2d) 517; Brown v. United States, (8th Cir. 1955) 225 F. (2d) 861. 
5 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Dismang, (10th Cir. 1939) 106 F. (2d) 362; United 
States v. Higginson, (1st Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 439. It is also generally held that an 
opinion cannot be a judgment. In re D'Arcy, (3d Cir. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 313; Winkelman 
v. General Motors Corp., (S.D. N.Y. 1942) 48 F. Supp. 490. However, the judgment can 
-be added to the opinion. In re Forstner Chain Corp., note 4 supra; Steccone v. Morse-
Starrett Products Co., (9th Cir. 1951) 191 F. (2d) 197. Further, the judgment can be 
given orally. In re Forstner Chain Corp., note 4 supra. 
6 Matteson v. United States, note 4 supra. 
7 Bowles v. Rice, (6th Cir. 1946) 152 F. (2d) 543. 
8 United States v. Higginson, note 5 supra; Papanikalaou v. Atlantic Freighters Ltd., 
(4th Cir. 1956) 232 F. (2d) 663; Cedar Creek Oil and Gas Co. v. Fidelity Gas Co., (9th 
Cir. 1956) 238 F. (2d) 298. 
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applied in a criminal case,9 has declared that the formal judgment is prima 
fade the final judgment if there is any doubt as to the finality of the first 
judgment. The majority found that the failure to state the exact amount 
due plaintiff in the first judgment raised a question as to the judge's intent. 
The fact that a search of the record would enable a computation of inter-
est did not rectify the situation, since the entry of judgment could not show 
its substance as required by rule 79(a).10 If the purpose of rules 58 and 
79(a) is practical and for the benefit and protection of the parties,11 the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment should be sufficient in itself to 
apprise the parties,12 and therefore should suffice as the judgment needed 
for entry. By giving consideration to the second judgment, the Court now 
allows counsel to control to some extent the time for appeal, since counsel 
may submit a formal judgment at any time for the judge's signature.13 
Moreover, by establishing a presumption in favor of the formal judgment 
in determining what constitutes a final judgment, the Court has virtually 
eliminated local practice as an evidentiary factor where the judge's intent 
may be in doubt, despite the reliability of local practice in providing some 
certainty as to the finality of judgments in each court.14 But in so doing, the 
Court has failed to substitute a uniform rule that will enable a definite 
determination of finality to be made in all federal courts, since intent re-
mains the primary factor and the presumption applies only in doubtful 
cases. Thus there still exists uncertainty as to what constitutes a final judg-
ment or its entry in federal practice.15 In light of these considerations, it is 
believed that an amendment to rule 58 is in order requiring specific direc-
tion to the clerk to enter final judgment.16 
Arnold Henson, S.Ed. 
9 United States v. Hark, 320 U.S. 531 (1944). For two cases holding that the reasoning 
of the Hark case applies to civil cases, see, e.g., O'Brien v. Harrington, (D.C. Cir. 1956) 
233 F. (2d) 17; Bowles v. Rice, note 7 supra. 
10 See United States v. Cooke, (9th Cir. 1954) 215 F. (2d) 528. Cf. Porter v. Bordens 
Dairy Delivery Co., (9th Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 798; Reynolds v. Wade, (9th Cir. 1957) 
241 F. (2d) 208. 
11 Greenwood v. Greenwood, (3d Cir. 1956) 234 F. (2d) 276; Klein v. Nu-Way Shoe 
Co., (2d Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 986. 
12 United States v. Wissahickon Tool Works, (2d Cir. 1952) 200 F. (2d) 936. Contra, 
Brown v. United States, note 4 supra. 
13 See United States v. Roth, (2d Cir. 1953) 208 F. (2d) 467. 
14 In re Forstner Chain Corp., note 4 supra; Commissioner v. Estate of Bedford, 325 
U.S. 283 (1945); principal case at 249, dissenting opinion. See also J. E. Haddock, Ltd. 
v. Pillsbury, (9th Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 820, cert. den. 329 U.S. 719 (1946), rehearing den. 
329 U.S. 826 (1946). 
15 See Erstling v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., (5th Cir. 1958) 255 F. 
(2d) 93. 
16 An amendment suggested in 18 Fed. Rule Serv. 930 (1953) reads as follows: "A 
direction by the court as to the judgment to be entered must be specific. Unless the 
court's direction is given to the clerk in open court and is noted in the minutes, it shall 
be evidenced by the signature of the judge on the judgment order. If an opinion or 
memorandum of decision is filed, it will be sufficient if a specific direction as to the 
judgment to be entered is included therein or appended thereto." 
